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The Distinction Between the Scope of Section 2(a) and Sections 
2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act 
Price discrimination, 1 under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 2 is lawful if it can be justified under one of several exculpatory 
provisions or if it has no adverse effect on competition. 3 In contrast, 
1. At law, price discrimination is a mere difference in price. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
363 U.S. 536 (1960). However, the economic definition is different from the legal definition. To 
an economist, price discrimination occurs when "two (or more) sales [are made] at prices that are 
not in the same proportion to the marginal cost of each sale." R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON• 
PATMAN ACT, FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 3 (1976) (quoting G. STIGLER, 
THE THEORY OF PRICE 209 (3d ed. 1966)). The difference in the two definitions is not of major 
practical significance, see note 42 infra, and the legal definition is a workable rule of thumb for 
measuring price - "provided the economic indicia of discrimination • . . are not ignored in the 
application of the other criteria of the statute." F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE 
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 97 (1962) (emphasis added). 
As § 2(a) recognizes, see note 3 infra, price discrimination can be either direct or indirect. 
Direct price discrimination occurs when the seller charges different prices to different purchasers 
for the same goods or offers one buyer discounts and allowances not available to another buyer. 
Indirect price discrimination occurs when the buyer receives something of value not offered to 
other buyers, through collateral contract terms or a separate and independent business arrange-
ment that has no nexus with the price quotation. See, e.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 
412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969); Robbins Flooring, Inc. v. Federal Floors, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 4, 8 
(E.D. Pa. 1977); F. ROWE, supra, at 103-05; Indirect Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 225 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Robinson-Patman Symposium]. 
The economic objections to price discrimination include: 
[F]irst • . . a price difference not justified by a difference in cost may distort competitive 
relationships and impair efficiency at the customer level. . . • The second economic objec-
tion to price discrimination is that it is a symptom of - and, more important, a condition 
fostering - monopoly or cartel pricing at the seller level. 
R. POSNER, supra, at 3-4. 
2. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 13-13b, 21a (1982)). 
3. Section 2(a) states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities . . . where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale • • • and 
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition 
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, 
or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent 
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale 
or delivery . . . And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price 
changes from time to time . . . in response to changing conditions affecting the 
market .... 
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) (emphasis in original). 
The "changing conditions" proviso permits a seller to respond to changes in market condi-
tions that are beyond his control by engaging in temporary and limited price discrimination. 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 178 
(1955). For example, if a firm sells a product in two areas and there is an unexpected increase in 
demand for its product in one area, the firm will raise its price in that area as a means of ration-
ing its supply, which has suddenly become short in relation to the newly increased demand. This 
price increase could create the illusion of price discrimination, because the firm will be selling the 
same good at different prices in different areas. However, as the seller increases output in the 
market in which demand has suddenly risen, prices will fall. This process of adjustment would 
1584 
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discrimination related to services and facilities, covered under sections 
2(d) and 2(e), is prohibited irrespective of competitive impact.4 A 
problem arises when a seller's discriminatory conduct conceivably falls 
within the scope of both section 2(a) and sections 2(d) or 2(e) of the 
Act. 5 If a plaintiff has the choice of suing under either or both sec-
be "inhibited rather than facilitated by forbidding the temporary 'discrimination.' " R. POSNER, 
supra note 1, at 13. This temporary discrimination is distinct from the systematic, persistent 
discrimination engaged in by cartels and monopolies. See id. at 13-15. It is unclear whether or 
not the judiciary can distinguish between sporadic and systematic discrimination. To avoid unin-
tentional "inhibition" of market price adjustment by the judiciary, the seller should be allowed to 
utilize the defenses available under§ 2(a). R. BORK, THE A.NrrrRUST PARADOX 391 (1978). 
Section 2(a) also has provisos allowing a seller to select his own customers, thereby refusing 
to deal with a potential customer, and allowing the seller to pass on to a purchaser savings 
associated with sale of a product in a specific quantity or by a particular method. For discussion 
of the consumer selection defense, see FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 64 (1959); 3 E. 
KINTNER & J. BAUER, FEDERAL A.NrrrRUST LAW 448-54 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 3 KINT-
NER & BAUER]; Barber, Refusals to Deal, PRAc. LAW., Jan. 1957, at 21-23. For discussion of 
the cost-justification defense, see 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra, at 323-72; F. RowE, supra note 1, 
at 265-321; Kuenzel & Schiffres, Making Sense of Robinson-Patman: The Need to Revitalize Its 
Affirmative Defenses, 62 VA. L. REv. 1211, 1218-33 (1976); see also Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 
340 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1951). 
The seller also has a complete defense to a § 2(a) action if his discrimination was "made in 
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ••.. " 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982). Like-
wise, the seller has a tactical advantage because the majority of courts have held that the buyer 
(plaintiff) must prove an adverse effect on competition. See 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra, at 251-
54; see generally Brooks, Injury to Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 109 U. PA. L. 
REv. 777 (1961); cf. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953) (burden of proof on 
plaintiff in a§ 2(f) action). But see Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.) (burden 
of proof on defendant), cert denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). 
4. Section 2(d) reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment 
of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such 
commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or 
through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale 
of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, 
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other 
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities. 
15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1982). Section 2(e) states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another 
purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by 
contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or 
facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commod-
ity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms. 
15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1982). In contrast to a § 2(a) action, the buyer in a § 2(d) or § 2(e) action 
does not have to prove competitive injury. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 71 
n.18 (1959); Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 
911 (1974). Because §§ 2(d) and 2(e) operate independently of§ 2(a), the cost justification de-
fense of§ 2(a) does not apply. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). However, 
the "meeting competition" defense, discussed in note 3 supra, is available in a § 2(d) or § 2(e) 
charge. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert denied, 369 
U.S. 888 (1962). 
Although §§ 2(d) and 2(e) have some semantic differences, courts have construed them to 
impose identical duties on the seller. "[Section] 2(e) has long been viewed as coterminous with 
§ 2(d), and courts have consistently resolved the two sections into an harmonious whole.'' Kirby 
v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); see 3 
KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 534 n.4; see also F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 372; Annot., 24 
A.L.R. FED. 9, 33-34 (1975). 
5. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITIEE TO STUDY THE ANTrrRUST 
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tions, the distinctions between the provisions collapse, 6 and the choice 
of section may determine the success of the plaintiff's suit. 7 
This Note argues that sections 2(d) and 2(e) were meant to cover 
only disguised discriminations not within the scope of section 2(a).8 If 
the seller's conduct falls within the scope of section 2(a), that section 
must be applied regardless of whether or not the conduct also falls 
within the language of section 2(d) or 2(e). Only when section 2(a) 
does not apply is recourse available under sections 2(d) and 2(e). Part 
I of this Note looks at general antitrust policy, the limitations of the 
Clayton Act that led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act to show that 
the Act's purpose is to maximize consumer welfare by protecting com-
LAWS 191-92 (1955), observing that "[v]irtually identical trade practices have been deemed 'al-
lowances' in one case and 'indirect discriminations' in another . . . . The decisions, moreover, 
reveal no guide for distinguishing a justifiable 'indirect' discrimination from a flat per se offense." 
See also 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 184-85, 538; F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 106-07. 
The Supreme Court has not fashioned a determinative rule on how to classify conduct that 
could be "indirect" price discrimination or discrimination in "services and facilities." See FfC v. 
Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 343-44 & n.3 (1968) (noting that it is an open question whether 
§§ 2(a) and 2(d) are mutually exclusive or coextensive enough that the Commission could chal-
lenge the same conduct under both provisions). The lower courts have not developed a uniform 
answer to this problem. Compare In re Agricultural Labs, Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296, 301 (1938) (dis-
criminatory sales returns actionable under § 2(a)), with Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons v. FfC, 347 
F.2d 785, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (discriminatory sales returns violate §§ 2(d) and 2(e)); com-
pare Glowacki v. Borden, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 348, 355-56 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (discriminatory deliv-
ery service violates § 2(a) but might also violate §§ 2(d) and 2(e)), with David R. McGeorge Car 
Co. v. Leyland Motor Sales, 504 F.2d 52, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1974) (discriminatory delivery terms 
not within scope of § 2(e)), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975), and Centex-Winston Corp. v. 
Edward Hines Lumber Co., 447 F.2d 585, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1971) (discriminatory delivery serv-
ices within scope of§ 2(e)), cert denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). 
The classification of an action as price discrimination or services and facilities discrimination 
has practical importance. First, in a § 2(a) action, but not in a § 2(d) or § 2(e) action, plaintiff 
must prove an adverse competitive effect and defendant may raise the defense of cost justifica-
tion. See note 3 supra. Second, under §§ 2(d) and 2(e), discrimination is not directed to price 
but to other elements of the transaction. See note 4 supra. Third, discrimination in these two 
sections is couched as a substantive offense, while in § 2(a) it is couched as a jurisdictional pre-
requisite. See notes 3-4 supra; 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 538. 
6. In Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 
(1974), the court noted that indirect price discrimination under § 2(a) must be distinguished 
from disproportionate payments or services under §§ 2(d) and 2(e). Otherwise the distinction in 
schemes and standards would collapse, and the two sections would be mere surplusage. 489 F.2d 
at 910. For a discussion of the different standards of legality under each section, see notes 3-5 
supra. 
7. See, e.g., Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. 
Ill.), ajfd. per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966). The court ruled that § 2(a) explicitly cov-
ered delivery costs and therefore §§ 2(d) and 2(e) could not be applied. To a11ow a freight allow-
ance under§ 2(d) would "make nugatory the defenses specifically outlined for this offense." 254 
F. Supp. at 84. This would be "in contradiction to the apparent goal of all anti-trust legislation, 
by stifling price competition." 254 F. Supp. at 84. See notes 40-58 infra and accompanying text 
for discussion of the antitrust goal of promoting competition and its relation to the Robinson-
Patman Act. 
8. This Note addresses only the issue of which section-§ 2(a) or§§ 2(d) and 2(e)- should 
apply to the actions of a particular se11er. After determining which section governs the se11er's 
actions, one must consider the various legal criteria contained in that clause to determine the 
action's legality. See notes 3-4 supra. 
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petition. Part II argues that to accomplish this goal, courts should not 
allow plaintiffs to choose between section 2(a) and section 2(d) or 2(e). 
Instead, courts should determine if section 2(a) applies, and if it does, 
should apply section 2(a) to the exclusion of sections 2(d) and 2(e). 
This result is consistent with the legislative history of the sections and 
with Supreme Court interpretations of this history. Part III develops 
an analytical framework for determining whether discriminatory con-
duct is within the scope of section 2(a) and, if not, whether it is within 
th~ scope of sections 2(d) and 2(e). 
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 
This Part examines the purpose behind the Robinson-Patman Act 
and concludes that it is primarily to protect competition. Factors rele-
vant to this inquiry include the general antitrust scheme of which the 
Act is a part; the Clayton Act, which it amends; the circumstances 
surrounding its enactment; and the legislative history of the Act. 
A. The Antitrust Laws 
The Robinson-Patman Act, passed in 1936 as an extension of ear-
lier antitrust laws, must be reconciled "with the broader antitrust poli-
cies that have been laid down by Congress."9 Federal antitrust law 
promotes competition10 by regulating activities that "might restrain or 
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states."11 "Competi-
tion"12 is a term of art, defined in economics as "any state of affairs in 
which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alterna-
tive state of affairs through judicial decree."13 Consumer welfare is 
maximized through economic efficiency.14 An activity that restrains 
9. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FrC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953); see also Jefferson County Pharma-
ceutical Assn. v. Abbott Labs, 460 U.S. 150 (1983); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 
U.S. 373 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. FrC, 340 U.S. 231 (1950). . 
10. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) ("The heart of our 
national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, 'Congress was dealing with competition, 
which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.' ") (citation omitted); see 
also R. BORK, supra note 3, at 58 ("The polar models of the Clayton Act and its various amend-
ments • . • are 'competition' and 'monopoly.' "). 
11. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 157 (1983) (quot-
ing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)). 
12. Judge Bork argues that competition is an economic concept and therefore only economic 
definitions should be used. He believes much of the confusion in antitrust law is due to the 
judiciary's infusion of social and political considerations into the definition of competition. R. 
BORK, supra note 3, at 58-61. 
13. Id. at 61 (emphasis added). 
14. This approach assumes that the consumer is rational, has perfect information and there-
fore maximizes his utility given the constraints of his resources. The most efficient firm will be 
favored by consumers because it offers the lowest price for goods of a particular quality. An 
inefficient firm will be forced to match its competitor's price (which it can do in the long run only 
by becoming efficient) or its customers will switch to a competitor. However, when a business 
gains a monopoly it can restrict output and therefore raise prices because consumer demand now 
1588 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1S84 
output15 is economically inefficient and harms consumer welfare, and 
therefore is within the scope of antitrust regulation. 
The antitrust laws as a whole are economically oriented and the 
individual statutes should be read in light of this orientation. 16 In its 
Sylvania 17 opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that "[c]ompetitive 
economies have social and political as well as economic advantages, 
but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would 
lack any objective benchmarks."18 This emphasis on economic criteria 
is important when other goals that have been attributed to the anti-
trust laws, 19 such as protection of small businesses, conflict with con-
sumer welfare maximization. 
Other goals should be viewed as subordinate to protecting the con-
sumer from restricted output.20 As one commentator has observed, 
the Sylvania opinion "represents a movement away from earlier cases 
that reflected the view that the antitrust laws could and should satisfy 
more than one goal, and toward a recognition that consumer wealth 
maximization should be the sole policy underlying antitrust enforce-
ment. "21 Thus, any interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act must 
be consistent with the broader goal of consumer welfare maximization, 
which is obtained through promoting economic efficiency. 
exceeds the artificially limited supply. See Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League 
as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Shennan Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare 
Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1983). See generally R. BORK, supra note 3; R. POSNER, THE 
.ANTrrRusr LAW-AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). But see Elzinga, The Goals of Anti-
trost: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 12S U. PA. L. REV. 1191 
(1977) (arguing that economic efficiency may be traded off to promote social goals). 
1S. Output is restricted whenever the market fails to deliver the best product at the lowest 
price. Thus output can be restricted by decreasing supply, as well as by less obvious means, such 
as reducing the product's quality while maintaining the same price. See Bork, The Rule of Rea-
son and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 77S (196S). 
16. See notes 9-12 supra; see also D.E. Rogers Assocs. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 
1431, 1440 (6th Cir. 1983) (court refused to apply Robinson-Patman Act to conduct that was 
"well within the competitive boundaries the antitrust laws were enacted to protect"), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 3S13 (1984). 
17. Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
18. 433 U.S. at S3 n.21 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
19. For a discussion of the other goals, see, e.g., 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 690-
92 (claiming that preservation of small businesses is a principal goal); Elzinga, supra note 14, at 
1200-02 (arguing that promotion of the liberty of the entrepreneur is a legitimate antitrust goal); 
Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 4S .ANTrrRusr L.J. 18, 19-20 (1976) (suggesting that the Robinson-
Patman Act was motivated by interests other than preserving competition, such as the protection 
of small businesses); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources 
of Wisdom for Antitrost?, 12S U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977) (arguing that antitrust has multiple 
goals); see also note 39 infra. 
20. See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 6S-66. But see authorities cited at note 19 supra. 
21. Grauer, supra note 14, at 11. 
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B. Inadequacies of the Original Clayton Act in Handling New 
Forms of Discrimination 
The price discrimination clauses of the original Clayton Act22 were 
ineffective in curbing excessive concessions secured from sellers by the 
large chain store buyers.23 The Clayton Act attempted to curb price 
discriminations related to local or territorial price cutting, whereby 
national trusts slashed prices in certain localities to eliminate smaller 
competing sellers.24 The lower courts interpreted this congressional 
emphasis on protection of competition25 at the primary seller level as 
barring relief at the secondary buyer level.26 Although the Supreme 
Court overruled these interpretations to allow an action for price dis-
crimination at the buyer level, 27 a buyer's action was still foiled by the 
unconditional exemption the statute gave to price differences "on ac-
count of the differences in the grade, quantity, or quality of the com-
modity sold."28 The effect of this provision was to allow sellers to 
22. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(1982)). 
23. See FrC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1968); 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra 
note 3, at 45; F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 6-7. See generally Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A 
Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1113, 1120-24 (1983). 
24. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1909), the circuit court 
failed to discuss whether or not area price discrimination or receipt of railroad rebates was illegal 
under the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act was passed in response to dissatisfaction with this 
opinion. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 22-23; see H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
(1914): 
Section 2 of the Bill • . . is expressly designed with the view of correcting and forbidding a 
common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby certain great corporations . . • have 
heretofore endeavored to destroy competition and render unprofitable the business of com-
petitors by selling their goods, wares, and merchandise at a less price in the particular com-
munity where their rivals are engaged in business than at other places throughout the 
country. 
25. The Clayton Act was consistent with the general antitrust policy of promoting competi-
tion. Under § 2, price discrimination was considered unlawful if its effect was "substantially to 
lessen competition" or to "tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13(a) (1982). For a discussion of seller-level discrimination, see C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMI-
NATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 7 (1952); Rowe, The 
Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 51 CoLUM. L. REV. 1059, 
1063 (1957). 
26. The lower courts held that price discrimination that affected competition at the buyer 
level among competing customers of the seller was outside the scope of § 2 of the Clayton Act. 
See, e.g., National Biscuit Co. v. FrC, 299 F. 733 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924); 
Mennen Co. v. FrC, 288 F. 774 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923). See 3 KlNTNER & 
BAUER, supra note 3, at 46; see generally Rowe, supra note 25, at 1063-64. 
27. George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929) (arguing that the 
statutory language of the Clayton Act prohibited the injuring of competition among buyers as 
well). 
28. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). This provision would allow unlimited 
price differentials to qualify as quantity discounts. Even a minor quantity difference could sup-
port a major price difference. F. RowE, supra note 1, at 7; see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. FrC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.) (allowing unlimited quantity discounts under the original § 2), 
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939); To AMEND TuE CLAYTON Acr: HEARING ON H.R. 8442, 
H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062 BEFORE THE HOUSE CoMMITfEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 74th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 214, 248, 257-58 (1935) (concerning the broadening of the scope of§ 2 of the Clayton Act). 
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grant "quantity discounts" that exceeded any real cost savings in sell-
ing to the quantity buyer. 29 
The 1914 legislature that enacted the original Clayton Act focused 
primarily on seller competition, failing to foresee the growth of buyer 
chain stores. During the 192Os and 193Os, grocery chains and other 
mass marketers began to grow rapidly, nearly tripling their share of 
total retail sales to the detriment of the independent retailer.30 These 
stores were able to use their concentrated buying power to compel 
preferential concessions from sellers, concessions that were outside the 
scope of section 2 of the Clayton Act. 31 These concessions endangered 
the competitive position of independent local merchants who lacked 
sufficient economic power to compel similar concessions for them-
selves and for whom the antitrust laws provided no remedy.32 As a 
result, organizations of small businessmen lobbied for a strong law to 
curb the power of these chain buyers. 33 
At the direction of Congress, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) undertook an exhaustive investigation of these chain stores.34 
The Commission's report showed that the chain stores' ability to un-
dersell their independent competitors was based only partially on effi-
ciency.35 The chain stores' competitive advantage derived from the 
quantity and functional discounts that they were receiving, based on 
volume of sales, or from performance of certain marketing functions 
for which the independent competitor could not qualify.36 In addi-
tion, the chain stores gained a competitive advantage through prefer-
ential treatment - including receipt of brokerage payments and 
promotional allowances - that was often granted secretly, often 
outside the knowledge of their competitors. 37 The report concluded 
that some of the concessions granted to large chain store buyers were 
not based on efficiency.38 
The report prompted congressional action. The Robinson-Patman 
Act was proposed in response to the inadequacies of the Clayton Act 
29. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1953). 
30. See F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 5; Rowe, supra note 25, at 1062. See generally C. AusrJN, 
supra note 25, at 4-10; Bernard, Handling Modem Buyers: A New Look at Payments for Services 
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 44 ALB. L. REV. 89 (1979). 
31. 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 4S-46. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying 
text. 
32. See 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 48. 
33. C. AUSTIN, supra note 25, at 8. 
34. s. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CoNG. REc. 8522 (1928); see E. DAVIS, CHAIN 
STORES: FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, s. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1935) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. 
35. 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 48; FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 57-63. 
36. FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 64-65, 90; 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 46; 
Bernard, supra note 30, at 91; see also note 28 supra. 
37. C. AUSTIN, supra note 25, at 8; FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 57-63, 85. 
38. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 85-86. 
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in dealing with these buyer-level price discriminations. The Act's 
sponsors claimed that it would "close many dangerous loopholes that 
were found in the Clayton Act, but would leave the fields of competi-
tion free and open to the most efficient and, in fact, would protect them 
the more securely against the aggressions of those having greater 
purchasing power. "39 
C. Legislative History of the Robinson-Patman Act 
The legislative history supports the conclusion that the purpose of 
the Robinson-Patman Act is to maximize consumer welfare by 
strengthening competition, not to protect the independent retailer 
from the competition of chain stores.40 Congress believed many price 
differences were predatory exercises of monopoly power that were not 
economically justified.41 The Robinson-Patman Act was designed to 
39. 80 CoNG. REc. 3113 (1936) (statement of Senator Logan) (emphasis added). This state-
ment implies that the purpose of the bill was consistent with the purpose of antitrust law - to 
protect competition. However, in the same statement, he reversed his position: "The more im-
portant concern is in injury to the competitor who has suffered by the discrimination." Id. at 
3113 (emphasis added). This statement implies that the purpose of the Act was to protect the 
retailer, rather than to protect competition. Much of the confusion surrounding the Robinson-
Patman Act results directly from the confusion surrounding its purposes - protection of compe-
tition versus protection of the independent retailer. 
As Part I.A. shows, see notes 9-21 supra and accompanying text, consumer welfare max-
imization - protection of competition to promote economic efficiency - should be the predomi-
nant goal of antitrust policy. If protection of the independent retailer would conflict with 
economic efficiency, the economically efficient choice should prevail. 
40. The House Judiciary Committee Report explicitly states: 
The purpose of this proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible, equality of opportu-
nity in business by strengthening antitrust laws and by protecting trade and co=erce 
against unfair trade practices and unlawful price discrimination, and also against restraint 
and monopoly for the better protection of consumers, workers, and independent producers, 
manufacturers, merchants, and other businessmen. 
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936) (emphasis added). Senator Logan, floor 
manager of the bill, explained the committee's concern with chain stores: 
[I]f the tendencies [of discriminatory allowances to chain stores] are continued for a few 
years, there will be a complete monopoly of many of the necessities of life. When that time 
comes the consumer will be at the mercy of such monopoly, and the sensible thing to do is to 
prevent the coming of that day by attacking the problem in time . . • • [O]ne of the chief 
aims of government is to protect the people against aggressions that naturally follow the 
creation of a monopoly. 
80 CoNG. REc. 3117 (1936); see also SO CoNG. REc. 8115-16 (1936) (statement of Senator Pat-
man, coauthor of the bill, regarding monopoly potential of chain stores); 80 CoNG. REc. 8125-27 
(1936) (remarks of Rep. Crawford, member of the House Co=ittee and Subcommittee that 
considered the bill). Senator Logan further explained that the Robinson-Patman Act would not 
"interfere in any way with legal competition" but rather would avoid "destroying competition" 
and the resulting monopoly. 80 CoNG. REc. 3117 (1936) (emphasis added); see also FTC v. 
Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 68-71 & n.18 (1959). 
41. See note 40 supra. Representative Patman, co-sponsor of the bill, explained the congres-
sional concern regarding monopolistic predatory practices not based on economic efficiency: 
"[The chain stores] may meet competition ... but they cannot cut down the price below cost for 
the purpose of destroying the local man." 80 CoNG. REc. 8235 (1936). 
Judge Posner points out that "the existence of price discrimination is evidence that the seller 
or sellers engaged in the discrimination have - and are exercising - monopoly power." R. 
POSNER, supra note 1, at 5. Not only does this power distort competitive relations at the buyer 
level, but it also creates inefficiencies in the seller's market. These expenditures represent a 
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strengthen section 2 of the Clayton Act by suppressing "discrimina-
tions between customers of the same seller not supported by sound 
economic differences in their business positions or in the cost of serving 
them."42 Consistent with consumer welfare maximization,43 cost-jus-
tified price concessions were still allowed.44 This was accomplished by 
amending and strengthening the Clayton Act to prohibit discrimina-
tions in price between purchasers "where such discriminations cannot 
be shown to be justified by differences in the cost. "45 
The statutory defenses for price discrimination46 show Congress's 
concern with protecting competition at the buyer level as a means of 
promoting consumer welfare. If the Act's sole purpose was to protect 
the independent retailer, 47 the economic justifications would be irrele-
"deadweight social cost" and hence conflict with the goal of consumer welfare maximization. 
See id. at 4-12; see also note 39 supra and accompanying text (importance of economics to the 
Act). 
42. H.R. REP. No. 2287, supra note 40, at 7 (emphasis added). Although the legal and 
economic definitions of price discrimination differ, see note 1 supra, the difference is not of major 
significance because price discrimination is only a jurisdictional element and not a substantive 
element of a § 2(a) violation. See note 5 supra. Also, the availability of the cost-justification 
defense under § 2(a), see note 3 supra, theoretically should bring these two definitions into har-
mony. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 40. Posner notes that making cost-:justification a defense 
rather than part of the prima facie case, as the economic definition would do, is not a critical 
factor in deciding most cases. "The main objection to the cost-justification provision in section 
2(a) is not that the burden of proof is on the defendant but that the commission has been so 
niggardly in the scope it has allowed to the cost-justification defense." Id. at 40. 
43. See notes 9-21 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of consumer welfare max-
imization. As Judge Bork states: 
[T]he obvious congressional intention [is] to let lower costs be reflected in lower prices even 
when a rival was thereby injured • • . . This willingness to let efficiency have its way in the 
marketplace is not only proconsumer in itself but throws new light on the rest of the statute. 
Congress obviously thought that many of the price differentials in existence did not reflect 
real economies, but rather the predatory exercise of power. Both points indicate a basic 
consumer welfare rationale. 
R. Bom::, supra note 3, at 68-69. 
44. See note 3 supra for a discussion of the cost-justification proviso of§ 2(a). In explaining 
the cost-justification defense, Rep. Utterback, Chairman of the House Conferees, stated: 
It is through [the cost-justification] clause that the bill assures to the mass distributor, as to 
everyone else, full protection in the use and rewards of efficient methods in production and 
distribution in return for depriving him of the right to crush his efficient smaller competitors 
with the power and resources of mere size. There is no limit to the phases of production, 
sale, and distribution in which such improvements may be devised and the economies of 
superior efficiency achieved, nor from which those economies, when demonstrated, may be 
expressed in price differentials in favor of the particular customers whose distinctive meth• 
ods • • . make them possible. 
80 CoNG. REc. 9417 (1936); see also 80 CoNG. REc. 8111 (1936) (Rep. Patman noting that "the 
bill expressly provides that the manufacturer may have a difference in price where there is a 
difference in cost of manufacture."). 
45. H.R. REP. No. 2287, supra note 40, at 3; see also 80 CoNG. REc. 8111 (1936) (Sen. 
Patman explains that the purpose of the bill was to prevent coerced concessions, but 
"recogniz[es] the right of the manufacturer to have a different price for a different quantity where 
there is a difference in the cost of manufacture."). 
46. See note 3 supra. 
47. In Jefferson County Pharmaceuticals Assn. v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150 (1983), the 
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether or not a government entity was excluded from the 
coverage of the Robinson-Patman Act. The plurality argued that the Act should be applied "to 
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vant. 48 Congress saw the potential for a monopoly in restraint of trade 
in the chain stores and wanted to stop this anticompetitive threat in its 
infancy;49 although the independent retailer benefited from such law, 
his benefit was only incidental to the protection of competition. 50 
Advertising allowances that were not used for advertising were a 
particular abuse uncovered by the FTC chain store investigation. 51 
The legislative history of sections 2(d) and 2(e)52 shows that Congress 
intended the Act to end this abuse in order to aid advertising in per-
forming its economic function of increasing consumption. 53 Congress 
believed these sections would prevent the diversion of funds intended 
for advertising54 and would prevent a buyer from circumventing sec-
tion 2(a)'s prohibition of price discrimination.55 
all combinations .•• organized to suppress co=ercial competition." 460 U.S. at 170 (quoting 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 332 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)). Yet, in deciding 
that the Robinson-Patman Act applied to government entities, the court reasoned that "[t]here is 
no reason . . . to deny small businesses . . . protection from the competition of the strongest 
competitor of them all." 460 U.S. at 171. This choice of wording seemingly implies that the 
purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to protect the independent retailer from competition. 
However, in light of the strong emphasis in the rest of the opinion on the evil of anticompetitive 
behavior of certain organizations, this "protection from competition" should be read narrowly as 
"protection from unfair competition." 
48. These economic justifications limit the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act to systematic 
price discrimination rather than sporadic discrimination. See note 3 supra. If the primary pur-
pose of the Act was to protect the independent retailer, Congress would have wanted to protect 
him from any price differences, including those of a sporadic nature, and Congress would have 
banned all price differences between customers. Cf. AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & 
Sons, 705 F.2d 1203, 1207 n.5 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[The Robinson-Patman Act] also permits the 
defenses of meeting competition, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b), cost-differential, and changing market, 15 
U.S.C. § 13(a). The existence of these defenses shows that Congress considered price discrimina-
tion to be reasonable in at least these circumstances."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983). 
49. See note 40 supra. 
50. As Judge Bork points out: "[T]he legislative history shows predominant concern for 
consumers, with protection of small competitors intended only when that was a means of pro-
tecting consumers from monopoly not based on efficiency." R. Boru::, supra note 3, at 64. See 
also Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 548 (9th Cir. 1983) 
("[N]either section 2(a) nor any other provision of the antitrust laws was intended to protect 
competitors as opposed to competition.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984). 
51. Patman noted that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) were passed in response to the FrC chain store 
investigation. w. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 129 (1963). 
52. See note 4 supra for text of§§ 2(d) and 2(e). 
53. See W. PATMAN, supra note 51, at 126. 
54. See id., at 126-30. The Robinson-Patman Act aided advertising in fulfilling "its eco-
nomic function by requiring advertising allowances to be used for advertising." Id. at 127; see 
also H.R. REP. No. 2287, supra note 40, at 15-16 ("Such an [advertising] allowance becomes 
unjust when the service is not rendered as agreed and paid for, or when, if rendered, the payment 
is grossly in excess of its value."); id. at 16; 80 CoNG. REc. 6282 (1936) (Sen. Logan notes that 
"[i]t is provided in the Robinson Bill that money allowed for advertising purposes must be used 
to advertise the goods of the seller."). 
55. Sen. Logan explained the per se standards of these sections: 
One practice which has been indulged in to evade the provisions of the Clay:ton Act is for 
the seller to make certain service allowances to the purchaser. They may be called advertis-
ing allowances. When the purchaser had great purchasing power he could demand that 
great concessions be made to him; but here was the Clayton Act, which said "You cannot 
make discriminations in prices." So there was devised a second scheme under which the 
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The legislative history, viewed in combination with the antitrust 
laws' goal of protecting consumer welfare56 and with congressional 
concern over the monopoly potential of large retail chains, 57 requires 
the conclusion that the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is to 
maximize consumer welfare by protecting competition, even at the ex-
pense of the independent retailer.58 
II. EXCLUSIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2(a) IN ALL CASES OF 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Although characterization of conduct as "indirect" price discrimi-
nation under section 2(a) or as a service or facility under sections 2(d) 
or 2(e) is extremely significant,59 the courts have been unable to de-
velop a coherent general rule. 60 Some courts have held that these sec-
tions are not mutually exclusive; therefore conduct may fall within the 
prohibition of both sections. 61 Other courts have rejected this ap-
seller said, "We will make you an advertising allowance or a service allowance which will 
bring about a discrimination in prices." 
80 CoNG. REc. 6282 (1936); see also FfC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 68 (1959) 
(arguing that the purpose of the per se standards of§§ 2(d) and 2(e) was to create a legal motive 
to "confine their discriminatory practices to price differentials, where they could be more readily 
detected and where it would be much easier to make accurate comparisons with any alleged cost 
savings") (footnote omitted); 80 CoNG. REc. 3114 (1936) (Sen. Logan discusses use of advertis• 
ing allowances to evade the law); 80 CoNG. REc. 9418 (1936) (Rep. Utterback, Chairman of the 
Senate-House Conferees, explains that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) were designed to prevent sellers from 
granting disguised discriminations related to cost as service or promotional allowances). See 
generally F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 365-72. 
56. See notes 9-21 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text. 
58. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text. The courts also have recognized that the 
primary purpose of the Act is to protect the competitive process, not the individual competitors. 
See Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 178 (1984); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 547-48 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel 
Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). But see Eximco, Inc. 
v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d SOS, 514 (5th Cir. 1984) ("We must examine§ 2(a) in the light of sound 
economic theory, and attempt to effectuafe as much as possible the somewhat paradoxical intent 
behind the Robinson-Patman Act, which is to promote competition by protecting competitors.") 
(footnote omitted). 
59. See note 5 supra for discussion of the differing burdens of proof in § 2(a) and § 2(d) or 
§ 2(e). See also 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 184 n.156, 190 (noting that the "inquiry 
as to the applicable statutory provision is not an idle one . . . because different standards of 
legality, and different defenses, apply to each of these provisions"); F. ROWE, supra note I, at 
106, 372 (noting the advantages to a defendant of a § 2(a) action and the advantages to a plaintiff 
of a § 2(d) or § 2(e) action); Hansen, supra note 23, at 1165 (arguing that determination of 
whether or not the seller violated § 2(a) or §§ 2(d) and 2(e) is "crucial" because §§ 2(d) and 2(e) 
have more limited defenses). 
60. For example, some courts have allowed an action under § 2(a) when discriminatory de-
liveries result in indirect price discrimination but have split on whether or not § 2(e) is also 
applicable. See Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 682 n.4 (10th Cir.) 
(noting the circuit split but avoiding the issue because § 2(e) was not argued on appeal), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984). 
61. See C. AUSTIN, supra note 25, at 126; see also Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FrC, 411 F.2d 
255, 258 (3d Cir. 1969) (prepayment of advertising allowances may violate both §§ 2(a) and 
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proach, holding that a section 2(d) or 2(e) action can only be brought 
after determining that section 2(a) does not apply. 62 These courts 
claim that "the theory that [sections] 2( d) and 2( e) proscribe acts 
which are themselves prohibited by [section] 2(a) is not supported by 
either the legislative history or the scheme of the Act."63 Still other 
courts have applied sections 2(d) and 2(e) to the exclusion of section 
2(a).64 Under these differing approaches, behavior such as making ad-
vertising allowances, 65 granting sales return privileges, 66 or providing 
warehousing67 or delivery services68 have been held violative of both 
sections 2(a) and 2(d) or 2(e). The economic cost of such confusion is 
substantial. 69 Moreover, price competition is stifled70 by the chilling 
effect on sellers who might not take actions that would be allowable 
under section 2(a), for fear of violating sections 2(d) or 2(e).71 
A section 2(d) or 2(e) action should only be allowed after a deter-
2(d)). Cf. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 990, 993 (8th Cir.) (illegal 
discrimination would be treated "just as properly" under either § 2(d) or 2(e)), cert denied, 326 
U.S. 773 (1945). 
62. See, e.g., Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 84-85 
(N.D. Ill.) ("We submit that the better view is to limit actions on price differentials ... to 
Section 2(a), and to consider Section 2(d) and 2(e) applicable only to unlawful promotional ar-
rangements connected with resale, i.e. services unrelated to price") (emphasis in original), affd. 
per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966); F. RowE, supra note 1, at 377 & n.57. 
63. Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
911 (1974). 
64. See, e.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 
824 (1962); Lang's Bowlarama, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (D.R.I. 1974); In re 
Joseph A. Kaplan, Inc., 63 F.T.C. 1308, 1329, 1346 n.2 (1963), modified and affd., 347 F.2d 785 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (all applying § 2(d) and/or § 2(e) to payments that resemble reductions in 
price); see 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 556. 
65. See, e.g., Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1966) (court allowed 
§ 2(a) action without deciding whether or not §§ 2(a) and 2(d) are mutually exclusive), revd. on 
other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 449-50 (2d Cir. 
1964) (applying § 2(a) but not § 2(d)); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.) 
(applying § 2(d) but not § 2(a)), cert denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). 
66. See, e.g., In re Agricultural Labs. Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296, 300 (1938) (challenged under 
§ 2(a)). 
67. See, e.g., In re Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 50 (1953) (challenged under 
§ 2(a)); In re Life Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472, 475 (1941) (challenged under § 2(d)). 
68. See, e.g., L & L Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 674 F.2d 1113, 1116-19 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(§ 2(e) does not apply to delivery services); Centex-Winston Corp. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 
447 F.2d 585, 587-88 (7th Cir. 1971) (delivery services covered by § 2(e)), cert denied, 405 U.S. 
921 (1972); Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 84-85 (N.D. 
Ill.) (freight allowances covered only by § 2(a)), affd. per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966). 
69. See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 384-85; see also note 71 infra. 
70. Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 84 (N.D. Ill.) 
(noting that price competition was stifled because "buyers and sellers were no longer free to 
haggle over basic price elements") (emphasis in original), affd. per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 
1966). 
71. "[E]very antitrust practitioner knows, that tens of thousands, probably hundreds of 
thousands, of pricing decisions every year are altered through fear of Robinson-Patman." R. 
BORK, supra note 3, at 384. This results in "deformation of market processes" and loss of na-
tional wealth. Id. at 384. 
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mination that section 2(a) does not apply.72 This is consistent with the 
goal of consumer welfare maximization, as it gives the seller the secur-
ity that an economically efficient decision will be protected under the 
provisions of section 2(a).73 
The exclusive application of section 2(a) to conduct that could also 
constitute a violation of sections 2(d) or 2(e) is c;onsistent with the 
legislative history of the Act. Because the legislative history supports 
protection of the competitive process, 74 the competition-related de-
72. A plaintiff should not be allowed to choose between § 2(a) and § 2(d) or § 2(e). The 
plaintiff would prefer a § 2(d) or § 2(e) action, because he would be able to bypass the more 
difficult burden of proof of § 2(a). See Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 254 F. 
Supp. 83, 85 (N.D. Ill.) ("When plaintiff herein dropped its charges of Section 2(a) violations 
... it did so to avoid the necessity of proving competitive injury, and to escape from meeting a 
cost justification defense. In the opinion of this Court, plaintiff did not have the opportunity to 
make such a choice."), ajfd. per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966). 
Several courts have used a method of analysis that allows a § 2(d) or § 2(e) action only after 
the court has determined that § 2(a) is inapplicable to the fact situation. In Chicago Spring, 254 
F. Supp. at 85, the district court determined that an action for discrimination in freight al-
lowances could only be brought under § 2(a), and that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) were therefore inapplica-
ble. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that any discrimination that would come within the confines 
of § 2(a) must be brought under that section, and that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) would only apply to 
services unrelated to price. 371 F.2d at 429. 
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that when a case (here a discrimination in freight al-
lowances) appears to fit under the language of both sections, § 2(a) must be applied. American 
Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir. 1951). The court did not detail its 
reasoning, possibly because it felt that this result was required but could not determine a proper 
rationale. However, promotion of the goal of consumer welfare maximization mandates such a 
result. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text. 
In Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904,910 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 
(1974), the Seventh Circuit allowed the plainilirs § 2(d) action only after determining that § 2(a) 
did not apply to the case. A district court in Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 
467 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D. Wis. 1979), determined that § 2(a) applied to the conduct and that 
therefore § 2(d) was inapplicable. 
The Supreme Court has not accepted a case requiring it to determine whether to apply § 2(a) 
or § 2(d) or § 2(e). However, in FI'C v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960), the Court 
considered an action that was within the scope of§§ 2(a) and 2(c). It held that §§ 2(a) and 2(c) 
were independent sections and "the fact that a transaction may not violate one section of the Act 
does not answer the question whether another section has been violated." 363 U.S. at 170. How-
ever, as Justice Whittaker pointed out in'his scathing dissent: 
[E]very case presenting this type of situation is actionable only under § 2(a), for it seems 
clear that § 2(a), which is expressly concerned with discrimination between purchasers, with 
effects on competition, and with the possible existence of true cost savings, was designed by 
Congress to cover this type of case. . • • The court's adroit footwork . . • serves quite effec-
tively to illustrate the reasons why I think the case before us is one which Congress intended 
should be actionable under § 2(a), rather than § 2(c) ...• 
363 U.S. at 189 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). By failing to see the relation-
ship between application of§ 2(a) and the goal of consumer welfare maximization, the majority 
failed to analyze this case properly. 
13. See Grauer, supra note 14, at 8 ("[T]he businessman who operates efficiently will aid 
society in its quest to attain the consumer welfare goal of providing the most goods at the lowest 
possible price."). Bork agrees that economically sound decisions should be protected by the law. 
"[The businessman] can know what the law is when the goal of the law is consumer welfare, 
because the major distinctions of such a system run along the same lines in which the business-
man thinks, making lawful his attempts to be more efficient •... " R. BORK, supra note 3, at 
81. 
74. See notes 40-58 supra and accompanying text. 
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fenses75 of section 2(a) should be available whenever possible to pro-
mote economically efficient forms of competition. 76 The legislatiye 
history shows that sections 2( d) and 2( e ), with their per se standard of 
illegality, were to apply only to sellers who had evaded the price dis-
crimination prohibition of section 2(a)77 by discriminating in respects 
other than price. 78 Congress had hoped that by applying a stricter 
standard in sections 2(d) and 2(e), sellers would be prompted to limit 
their differentials to price, thus making evaluation of cost justifications 
for the differentials easier.79 
Ill. DISTINGUISHING INDIRECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION FROM 
SERVICE OR FACILITY DISCRIMINATION 
This Note argues that any action for discrimination related to price 
must be brought under section 2(a).80 Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are appli-
15. See notes 3-5 supra (discussion of the defenses); notes 44-45 supra (discussion of the 
legislative history of these defenses). 
76. See note 73 supra; cf. Indian Coffee Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1104, 
1110 (W.D. Pa. 1980) ("[The] Robinson-Patman [Act] does not simply prohibit an undesirable 
end result (the substantial lessening of competition), but rather prohibits certain conduct where 
the effect thereof may be to bring about that undesirable end result.") (emphasis in original). 
11. See note 55 supra (discussion oflegislative history); see also Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 
489 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 2287, supra 
note 40, at 7 (fhe aims of the Robinson-Patman Act were "to suppress more effectually discrimi-
nations between customers of the same seller . . • sometimes effected directly in prices . . . and 
sometimes by separate allowances to favored customers .... ") (emphasis added). 
Rowe argues that the legislative history implicitly restricts §§ 2(d) and 2(e) "to advertising 
and promotional arrangements, to the exclusion of other incidents or terms of sale" which are 
covered by § 2(a). F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 377 & n.57. For example, the Senate-House Con-
ference Report explicitly stated "the bill should be inapplicable to terms of sale except as they 
amount in effect to indirect discriminations in price" under § 2(a). Id. 
Some confusion has surrounded Representative Utterback's statement of the purposes of 
§§ 2(d) and 2(e): 
The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is . . . the grant of discriminations 
under the g11ise of payments for advertising and promotional services which, whether or not 
the services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advantage to the customer so 
favored. . . . The prohibitions of the bill, however, are made intentionally broader than this 
one sphere in order to prevent evasion in resort to others by which the same purpose might 
be accomplished, and it prohibits payment for such services or facilities whether furnished 
"in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale" of the products 
concerned. 
80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) (emphasis added). As Rowe points out, the "intentionally broader" 
language did not mean the sections encompassed other forms of conduct besides advertising or 
promotional allowances, but rather that the statute prohibited both direct provision of advertis-
ing allowances and promotional allowances in connection with the "processing, handling" or sale 
of the product. F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 377 n.57. The correct interpretation should read, 
"and it therefore prohibits payments for such services . . . furnished" in connection with the 
processing, handling, sale or offering for sale "of the products concerned." Cf. Com Prods. Ref. 
Co. v. FrC, 324 U.S. 726, 744 (1945) (the court appeared to be relying on the above interpreta-
tion of Utterback's quote in concluding that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) reached an advertising service 
connected with "sale or offering for sale"). 
78. See Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D. Wis. 
1979); see also notes 72 & 77 supra. 
19. See FrC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 68 (1959). 
80. See notes 59-79 supra and accompanying text. 
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cable only to advertising and promotional arrangements unrelated to 
price. 81 Therefore one must determine as a threshold issue when a 
payment for a service or facility can be considered an indirect price 
discrimination that triggers a section 2(a) analysis. 
Section 2(a) explicitly outlaws both direct and indirect price dis-
criminations. 82 While not defined in the statute, price for Robinson-
Patman purposes has been defined as "the amount actually paid by the 
purchaser . . . the quoted invoice price less any discounts, offsets or 
allowances ... not otherwise reflected in the invoice price."83 Direct 
price discrimination is merely a price difference. 84 "Indirect price dis-
crimination . . . arises when one buyer receives something of value 
not offered to other buyers."85 
Courts have tried to develop specific criteria to help in applying 
this general formula. 86 The FTC argues that section 2(a) applies to 
payments that help the original sale, while sections 2(d) and 2(e) apply 
to payments that facilitate the resale. 87 Many courts have adopted the 
FTC original sale/resale dichotomy as a general rule. 88 However, this 
formulation has been subject to inconsistent interpretation89 and con-
81. See Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 84-85 (N.D. 
Ill.) ("We submit that the better view is to limit actions on price differentials .•• to Section 2(a), 
and to consider Section 2(d) and 2(e) applicable only to unlawful promotional arrangements 
connected with resale, i.e. services unrelated to price.") (emphasis in original), ajfd. per curiam, 
371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966). See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text for legislative sup-
port of the Chicago Spring position. 
82. "It shall be unlawful for any person • . . either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in 
price between different purchasers of commodities ••. ," 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982), 
83. Diehl & Sons v. International Harvester Co., 445 F. Supp. 282, 286 (E,D.N.Y. 1978); see 
Robbins Flooring, Inc. v. Federal Floors, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E,D. Pa. 1977). 
84. See note 1 supra. 
85. Robbins Flooring, Inc. v. Federal Floors, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (citation 
omitted). 
86. See Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 
1980) ("Certain more specific criteria have been devised to aid in applying this general formula; 
namely, whether the 'payment' is directly related to the quantity of goods purchased, or facili-
tates the original sale of the product to the retailer.") (citations omitted). 
81. See New England Confectionery Co., 46 F.T.C. 1041 (1949) (FfC holds that§ 2(a) ap-
plies when the discrimination is related to the original sale by the seller to the purchaser, while 
§§ 2(d) and 2(e) cover the subsequent resale by the purchaser). 
88. See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); L & L Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 674 F.2d 1113, 1119-21 
(5th Cir. 1982); Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
417 U.S. 911 (1974); Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1956); see 
also C. AusnN, supra note 25, at 122; 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 191; F. ROWE, 
supra note 1, at 107. 
89. Compare L & L Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 674 F.2d 1113, 1116-19 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(late delivery not connected with resale so as to trigger§ 2(d) application), with Centex-Winston 
Corp. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 447 F.2d 585, 587-88 (7th Cir. 1971) (late delivery suffi-
ciently connected with resale to trigger§ 2(d) application), cert denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). See 
also Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 85 (N.D. Ill.) (court avoids 
the question by defining resale as "unrelated to price"), ajfd. per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir, 
1966) . 
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tradicts the legislative mandate by allowing a section 2(d) or 2(e) ac-
tion when the conduct in reality amounted to a price reduction and 
therefore should be tried under section 2(a).90 
The best approach is to look at the particular action91 to determine 
whether or not its net effect is a reduction in price.92 The legislative 
history indicates that the scope of indirect price discriminations is 
broad, encompassing both terms of sale and collateral contract terms 
that affect a seller's nominal price.93 Courts taking this broad view 
have correctly held that advertising allowances actually intended to 
reduce the purchase price fall within the scope of section 2(a).94 Other 
forms of payments for services and facilities have also been found to 
affect the net price and, therefore, to fall within the scope of section 
2(a).95 Delivery96 and credit allowances97 have also been found ac-
90. See, e.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.) (''[e]ven if these pay-
ments [of promotional allowances] were all no more than disguised price adjustments, ..• they 
would nevertheless violate § 2(d)."), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). 
91. A multipart transaction may be separated into its component parts to determine whether 
or not each section violates the Robinson-Patman Act. Each part of the transaction would be 
considered separate conduct. See Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 362 (9th Cir. 1966), 
revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968). 
92. See Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 682 (10th Cir.) (arguing 
that if the net effect is not a reduction in price the Act is inapplicable), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 
(1984). 
93. In the original version of the Act, § 2(a) reached direct or indirect discrimination "in 
price or terms of sale." However, the bill as passed by the House deleted the reference to terms 
of sale. The Senate-House Conference Committee accepted the House version, noting that "the 
bill should be inapplicable to terms of sale except as they amount in effect to indirect discrimina-
tions in price within the remainder of subsection (a)." H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 
5 (1936). In Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), the Supreme Court used the 
above language in the Conference Committee Report to hold that § 2(a) does reach terms of sale, 
and held that the term of sale resulted in an indirect price discrimination. 324 U.S. at 740. 
Accord Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 682 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
105 S. Ct. 178 (1984). See generally F. ROWE, supra note 1, at 103-07; Robinson-Patman Sympo-
sium, supra note 1, at 225. 
An interesting approach to defining such terms as "sales" and "terms of sale" was suggested 
by the court in Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956). The court used the definition of sale in the Uniform 
Sales Act, the forerunner of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), to determine whether the 
conduct in question resulted in a sale or an agency. Because the UCC covers almost all aspects 
of a sale, including terms of sale, similar use of the UCC could be helpful in determining if a 
transaction constituted a term of sale. 
94. See, e.g., Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 362 (9th Cir. 1966) ("[W]e think the 
Commission correctly decided that these excesses were 'outright price concessions' . . . cogniza-
ble under section 2(a)."), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); American Coop. Serum 
Assn. v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 913 (7th Cir.) (agreeing with the lower court that 
when the advertising and promotional allowances "were so greatly in excess . . . such rebates 
were merely for the purpose of reducing the purchase price"), cert. denied, 329 U.~. 721 (1946). 
The Robinson-Patman Act is limited to concessions from the seller to his buyer. It does not 
reach concessions directly from the seller to the consumer, the buyer's buyer. See Indian Coffee 
Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
95. See, e.g., Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 682 (10th Cir.) 
("Some delivery practices may constitute a violation of§ 2(a) because they directly or indirectly 
affect the price paid for the goods.") (citing Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945)), 
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984). See generally 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 3, at 555. 
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tionable under section 2(a). Failure to define indirect price discrimina-
tions as broadly as Congress intended results in "an improper 
incentive . . . for invoking the more 'absolute' prohibitions in Sections 
2(d) and 2(e) to attack the type of sales accommodation which is the 
equivalent of a price adjustment subject to the statutory criteria gov-
erning the legality of price variations by sellers."98 
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) should be applied only to advertising, pro-
motional or merchandising services, or facilities that are beyond the 
reach of section 2(a).99 A majority of courts have held that sections 
2(d) and 2(e) are limited to advertising, promotional or merchandising 
services, and facilities. 100 However, if thes_e forms of services and facil-
ities amount to a net price reduction, the legislative history mandates 
application of section 2(a). 101 This narrow reading would fulfill the 
legislative purpose for sections 2(d) and 2(e) - catching sellers who 
had evaded the prohibitions of section 2(a).102 It is consistent with the 
overall goal of consumer welfare maximization, because it would fore-
warn the seller as to what specific types of behavior would be outside 
the scope of section 2(a)'s cost-justification defense. 103 
The scope of sections 2(d) and 2(e) is further limited by the re-
quirement that the service or facility must be in relation to the same 
commodity that the buyer bought from the seller.104 "Commodity," 
96. Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 83-85 (N.D. 
Ill.), ajfd. per curiam, 371 F.2d 428, 429 (7th Cir. 1966); American Can Co. v. Russellville Can-
ning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir. 1951). 
97. Although credit may be outside the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act, see 3 KINTNER 
& BAUER, supra note 3, at 555, when such actions are allowed, § 2(a) is applied. See, e.g., ACS 
Enter. v. Sylvania Commercial Elec. Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 62,765 at 78,398, at 
78,399-400 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Robbins Flooring, Inc. v. Federal Floors, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 4, 8 
(E.D. Pa. 1977). But see Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 1968) (apply-
ing the proportionally equal standard of§§ 2(d) and 2(e) to credit), revd. on other grounds, 395 
U.S. 642 {1969). 
98. F. RowE, supra note 1, at 107 (footnote omitted). See note 72 supra and accompanying 
text for further discussion. 
99. See notes 55 & 77 supra and accompanying text. 
100. See, e.g., Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 910-11 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762, 765-66 (5th Cir. 
1956); Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 502 F. Supp. 637, 649 (D.N.J. 1980); Diehl 
& Sons v. International Harvester Co., 445 F. Supp. 282, 285-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
101. See notes 40-79 supra and accompanying text. 
102. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See notes 71 & 73 supra (discussion of the economic importance to a businessman of 
knowing the legal consequences of his actions). 
104. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 546-47 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984): 
Foremost's failure to allege resale of the photofinishing equipment, the commodities with 
respect to which the alleged discrimination in delivery and technical services occurred, is a 
failure as a matter of law to allege a crucial element of a section 2(e) violation ••. Instead, 
Foremost argues that its complaint states a section 2(e) claim because it resells other com-
modities . . . . Even if these specific commodities were purchased for resale • • • , Foremost 
did not contend that it resells the photofinishing equipment involved in the alleged 
discrimination. 
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for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act, has been defined as a tangi-
ble product, not a service provided by the buyer who uses the prod-
uct.105 A problem may arise distinguishing the buyer's resale of a 
product when he provides some services along with the product he 
sells, and the buyer's sale of his services when he uses the seller's prod-
uct to promote his services.106 The inquiry should focus on whether 
or not the buyer's dominant intent, as revealed by the surrounding 
circumstances, was to resell the product or to sell his services.107 One 
relevant consideration would be the type of business and whether sell-
ers in this line of business are generally considered product or service 
sellers. 108 Courts should also consider whether the buyer's advertising 
emphasized the product or his services.109 An additional factor would 
be the expectations of the customers of the buyer and whether their 
main purpose in going to the buyer was the services he provides or the 
product he sells.110 
A final argument relates to the institutional competence of the 
courts to evaluate these factors. Any detailed inquiry will force judges 
(emphasis in original). A product may undergo processing or handling and still qualify as the 
same product. 
In view of the purpose of the statute to prevent the enumerated discriminations attending 
the sale of a commodity for resale, the precise nature or extent of the processing before 
resale would seem to be immaterial. The statute is aimed at discrimination by supplying 
facilities or services •.. in all cases where the commodity is to be resold, whether in its 
original form or in a processed product. The evils of the discrimination would seem to be 
the same whether the processing results in little or much alteration in the character of the 
commodity purchased and resold. 
Com Prods. Ref. Co. v. FfC, 324 U.S. 726, 744 (1945). 
105. See Baum v. Investors Diversified Serv., 409 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1969); Gaylord 
Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, 219 F. Supp. 400, 403 
(W.D. Pa. 1963); Hansen, supra note 23, at 1126 n.80. 
106. See Clairol, Inc. v. FfC, 410 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that because customers 
came specifically for the advertised Clairol products rather than the hairdresser's general serv-
ices, the transaction was the sale of a commodity within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman 
Act); Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1934) (in 
case arising under § 2 of the Clayton Act prior to the Robinson-Patman amendments, court held 
that transportation of customers was predominantly a sale of services, not a commodity), cert. 
denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935). 
107. In Baum v. Investors Diversified Serv., 409 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1969), the court had 
to determine whether the sale of mutual funds constituted the sale of a commodity or of a service. 
The court looked at the "dominant nature" of a mutual fund share in determining the issue. In 
an analogous situation, other cases have tried to distinguish the resale of the same product from 
consumption of the product to resell a new product. See, e.g., Com Prods. Ref. Co. v. FfC, 324 
U.S. 726, 744 (1945); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 356 
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); see note 106 supra. 
108. See Clairol, Inc. v. FfC, 410 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. 
United Press Intl., 369 F.2d 268, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1966). 
109. Clairol, Inc. v. FfC, 410 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that the purpose of the 
advertising was not only to persuade the reader to go to the salon for the service, but also to ask 
for Clairol products). 
110. See Clairol, Inc. v. FfC, 410 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir. 1969) ("The target of the persua-
sion was the potential customer of the salon and the persuasion, so far as Clairol was concerned, 
was to consume its products."). 
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to make detailed investigations of the economic consequences of the 
actors' behavior, forcing them to apply theory they may not thor-
oughly understand. The result may be a series of per se rules unrelated 
to the actual facts of a case and promoting inefficiency in certain 
circumstances.111 
By limiting the availability of sections 2(d) and 2(e) to actions be-
yond the scope of the indirect price prohibition of section 2(a), incon-
sistent application of the Robinson-Patman Act is avoided and .the 
legislative purpose is fulfilled. 
CONCLUSION 
To serve the goal of consumer welfare maximization, section 2(a) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should be read broadly to cover any form 
of direct or indirect price discrimination, including advertising and 
service allowances that serve as indirect price discriminations. Sec-
tions 2(d) and 2(e) should only be applied after a determination that 
section 2(a) is inapplicable. 
111. R. BORK, supra note 3, at 86-87, argues that the courts will fail to balance the economic 
issues on a case-by-case basis. Instead they will arrive at rigid rules that are arbitrary and 
anticonsumer. He also questions whether enough information is available to the courts to make 
this distinction. See id., at 399; see also R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 15 ("[T]he problem is to 
distinguish these practices in the real world, using the inevitably crude methods of • . • judicial 
factfinding. "). 
